

The Origins of the Berlin-Tokyo Axis Reconsidered: From the Anti-Comintern Pact to the Plan to Assassinate Stalin

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I. Introduction

The origins of the Berlin-Tokyo Axis have generally been traced to the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. In the conventional view, the Pact was primarily the work of German ambassador plenipotentiary for arms limitation Joachim von Ribbentrop (who became Germany's ambassador to Britain in the summer of 1936 and foreign minister in February 1938) in cooperation with the Japanese army's military attaché to Germany General Oshima Hiroshi. It is thought that Ribbentrop, who had been seeking ways to develop Germany's alliance with Japan, brought about the Pact after cooperating with Oshima on political affairs since the autumn of 1935 and later securing Adolf Hitler's support for the treaty. The so-called Anti-Comintern Pact Reinforcement Negotiations, held from 1938 to 1939, and the Tripartite Pact, signed by Japan, Germany and Italy in September 1940, are also regarded as essentially the results of Ribbentrop's initiatives. The account of these developments may be called the "Ribbentrop-centric theory." The aims of the present paper are to critique this theory and reinterpret the political origins of the Berlin-Tokyo Axis from a different perspective.¹⁾

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II. Japan-Germany Naval Technical Cooperation in the 1920s

The Treaty of Versailles, signed in June 1919, was intended to deprive Germany of its potential for rearmament and development of military technology. On the Japan side, the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in December 1922 forced the Imperial Japanese Navy to seek a new military partnership. Thus were established the international political conditions conducive to cooperation between the Japanese and German navies in the area of military technology.

Under the terms of the 1918 armistice agreement with Germany, the Imperial Japanese Navy had already acquired seven submarines from the German navy as spoils of war. After the signing of Treaty of Versailles the following year, the Japanese navy sent a military delegation to Germany led by Rear Admiral Kato Hiroharu. The delegation purchased submarine engines and assorted arms, and returned to Japan with admiration for the sophistication of German technology. In 1921, the Japanese navy sent Matsukata Kojiro, president of the Kawasaki Shipbuilding Company in Kobe, to Europe for negotiations. Matsukata invited German engineers to Japan, and Kawasaki Shipbuilding subsequently began constructing submarines based on German models.²⁾

Germany's future military recovery was at that time the German navy's top military and technological priority. To that end, the German navy, with the approval of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Paul Behncke, established in The Hague, the Netherlands a shipbuilding design office headed by Retired Lieutenant Commander Blum and Dr. Techel. The aim of the office was "to maintain the highest standard of technological development by constantly applying submarine construction technology in practice through business activities for foreign navies." That the Imperial Japanese Navy was one of this office's main customers is evident in the fact that Dr. Techel, then regarded as one of the world's leading authorities on submarine design, later assumed direct supervision of submarine construction at Kawasaki Shipbuilding.³⁾

III. Lieutenant Commander Canaris's Visit to Japan

Such technical cooperation between the Japanese and German navies was promoted on the political side by Dr. Friedrich W. Hack, of the trading company Sinzinger & Hack, and Lieutenant Commander Wilhelm W. Canaris of the German Naval General Staff. Dr. Hack had been taken prisoner by the Japanese army when it took the Chinese port city of Qingdao from Germany during World War I. After World War I, he applied his Japanese connections and command of the Japanese language to arms trade between Japan and Germany, and continued to figure prominently in key aspects of Japan-Germany relations up to the end of World War II. Canaris, meanwhile, played a leading role in German intelligence, being appointed Chief of the Abwehr in 1935. Immediately before the German surrender (in May 1945), Canaris was executed by the Nazi government for his involvement in a July 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler.⁴⁾

In June 1923, Captain Araki Jiro completed his term as the Japanese navy's military attaché to Germany and returned to Japan. Dr. Hack then sent a letter to the German navy proposing that exchange of know-how between the German and Japanese navies continue to be conducted through Captain Araki. On the basis of this proposal, the German navy dispatched Canaris to Japan in July 1923. Canaris's primary mission was "to gather information on the condition of U-boats being constructed by Kawasaki Shipbuilding and to provide assistance should problems be encountered."⁵⁾

Accompanied by Captain Araki, Canaris first of all visited Kawasaki Shipbuilding in Kobe, inspecting what he called its "highly advanced submarine construction" and receiving a warm welcome from his hosts, including company president Matsukata. Canaris wrote in his report on the visit that he had verified Kawasaki's construction of German-style U-boats to be sound, and that overall he had gained a very favorable impression. Canaris thereafter went to Tokyo to meet with top Japanese naval officials, including Navy Minister Takarabe Takeshi and Vice-minister Abo Ki-

yokazu, and spent about two weeks in detailed discussions on submarine and torpedo technology and related topics, primarily with technical experts.⁶⁾

On the basis of this experience, Canaris submitted the following assessment of the situation: "Should the Japanese navy be strengthened, the countries of the entente will have to shift their foreign policy priorities from Europe to the Far East. In that event, in order to ensure stability to their rear, the countries of the entente will become more willing to resolve European problems." From this, he draws the conclusion that Germany "should pursue a policy to support the Japanese navy."⁷⁾

IV. Canaris as Chief of the Abwehr

In January 1935, Canaris was reassigned from the navy to the post of Chief of the Abwehr in Germany's Ministry of Defense, that is, head of German military intelligence. The pro-Japanese stance he had acquired during his naval service was now applied in a different context. The prime concern for German intelligence at that time was the activities of the Soviet Union and the Comintern. The Comintern branded Germany, Japan, Italy and Poland as "fascist states" at its Seventh Convention in the summer of 1935, and was intensifying its opposition against those nations through Popular-Front tactics and other means. Vehemently opposed to this movement, Canaris stated in September 1935 that "the new German Reich (Nazi Germany) has on its own initiative undertaken the task of defeating the Soviet Union, the leading force of communist ideology."⁸⁾

In order to oppose the activities of the Soviet Union and the Comintern, Canaris focused on forming a kind of anti-Soviet "encirclement" of intelligence built on exchange of Soviet-related information with potential German allies. Specifically, from the spring to the fall of 1935, Canaris actively approached the military authorities of countries bordering the Soviet Union—including Hungary, Estonia and Finland—to discuss the sharing of information on the Soviet Union and ways to systematize such exchange. Canaris also continued his effort to establish cooperative relations with the Italian military, which was then in the process of shifting from an anti- to a pro-

German stance with the weakening of the Stresa Front.⁹⁾

Canaris was also interested in the intelligence potential of expatriate Germans living in Eastern Europe. In Germany, this issue was being handled by the Council of the Expatriate Germans, an organization led by Karl Haushofer, a professor of geopolitical science at Munich University. It was through the activities of this organization that Canaris established his connection with Ribbentrop.¹⁰⁾

As Chief of the Abwehr, Canaris wasted little time establishing contact with Oshima Hiroshi, who took up his post as military attaché in Berlin in April 1934. Canaris and Oshima found themselves to be kindred spirits. Oshima wanted Canaris to provide military information on the Soviet Union, and Canaris included Japan as an important factor in his scheme to create an intelligence network against the Soviet Union and the Comintern.

Meanwhile, Dr. Hack, who had established a close relationship with Canaris through the Japan-German naval contacts in the 1920s, was now working under Canaris in the Abwehr as an active intelligence operative in the area of Japanese affairs.

V. Japan-Germany Negotiations Involving Canaris and Ribbentrop

Early in 1935, Ribbentrop, then German ambassador plenipotentiary for arms limitation, made approaches, through Japanese affairs specialist Hack, to Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, who was in Europe to attend the London Naval Conference as Japan's ambassador plenipotentiary. Ribbentrop quietly dispatched Hack with orders to meet with Yamamoto, invite him to Germany, and arrange for him to meet with Hitler. Hack was required to "discreetly gauge Japan's attitude toward the possibility of a Japan-Germany-Poland alliance against the Soviet Union." However, this attempted overture toward the Japanese navy failed due to opposition from Japanese ambassador to Great Britain Matsudaira Tsuneo and others.¹¹⁾

Hack's next opportunity came roughly six months later, this time from the Japanese army via its military attaché to Germany, General Oshima Hiroshi. In September

ber 1935, in the latter stages of talks with Oshima regarding the provision of gliders, Hack himself was sounded out by Oshima on the possibility of a Japan-Germany military treaty centered around their common opposition to the Soviet Union. Because the question related to military affairs, Hack first consulted Canaris. It was Canaris, not Ribbentrop, who, through frequent talks with Oshima over the next two months, represented Germany in carrying forward negotiations on the details of the treaty.¹²⁾

It was not until 15 November that year that Ribbentrop became involved in these negotiations. Having secured Hitler's basic consent, Canaris and Ribbentrop then set about writing a draft of the treaty. The preamble to "the general treaty to be announced publicly" provided for "mutual cooperation" in the area of defense (in German: Abwehr) against the Comintern threat through "exchange of information regarding the Comintern's subversive activities both within and beyond each of the two signatories' borders"; while a secret supplementary protocol provided for a certain degree of military cooperation between them against the Soviet Union.¹³⁾

Thereafter, however, negotiations between Japan and Germany had to be suspended due to political circumstances both at the international level and within each of the two countries. Hitler eventually allowed the negotiations to be renewed only after the outbreak of civil war in Spain in July 1936—for him the signal that "the threat of communism" was at Europe's door. The Anti-Comintern Pact was finally concluded on 25 November 1936. In content it was almost identical to the draft put forward by the German side the previous year. Essentially an agreement providing for cooperation between Japanese and German authorities in the areas of intelligence and subversive activities against the Soviet Union and the Comintern, the Pact clearly represented the culmination of the political intentions of Wilhelm W. Canaris, Chief of the Abwehr in Germany's Ministry of Defense.¹⁴⁾

VI. The Oshima-Canaris Agreements

At the practical level, the cooperation in intelligence and subversive operations that

was provided for in the Anti-Comintern Pact was to be carried out between the respective intelligence agencies of Japan and Germany. Specifically, this meant the Abwehr (intelligence division) of the German Ministry of Defense (and German military attachés to Japan) and, on the Japan side, the Second Bureau (intelligence bureau) of the Army General Staff Office (and Japanese military attachés to Germany). Accordingly, on 11 May 1937, Canaris and Oshima concluded two supplementary agreements to the Anti-Comintern Pact, one concerning Japan-German exchange of information about the Soviet Union and the other concerning subversive activities against the Soviet Union. The key agreement in the present context is the latter, which included the following provisions:

1. Joint operations [in Soviet territories] shall include (a) strengthening of nationalist movements of all ethnic groups; (b) anti-communist propaganda; and (c) preparations for instigating revolutionary, terrorist and riotous activities at the outbreak of war.
2. The required preparations shall be made in respect to the entire Soviet Union, which shall therefore be divided into three spheres of interest: (a) the region bordering Europe to the west, from Finland to Bulgaria, shall be Germany's primary sphere of interest; (b) the region bordering Europe to the southwest (Turkey and Iran) shall be a common sphere of interest to both signatories; and (c) the region bordering Asia to the east shall be Japan's primary sphere of interest.
3. The joint operations shall be conducted from 1937 to 1941, in accordance with the appended five-year plan.
4. The cost of operations in the common sphere of interest shall be borne in equal shares by both signatories.
5. Each signatory shall constantly keep the other fully informed of the subversive conditions in its primary sphere of interest.

[6 and 7 omitted here]

8. In the event that either signatory is drawn into war against the Soviet Union, the other signatory shall use all possible means to strengthen its strategic operations in its primary sphere of interest and in the common sphere of interest, as defined in article 2.

VII. The 1938 Agreement on Intelligence and Subversive Activities

Canaris and Oshima subsequently worked on developing this cooperative relationship into formal written agreements between the two countries' military forces. This effort was suspended, however, with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. In February 1938, a coup d'etat-like transformation occurred in the power structure of Nazi Germany, as a result of which pro-Japanese Ribbentrop replaced pro-Chinese Freiherr von Neurath as foreign minister, and General Wilhelm Keitel, also a member of the pro-Japanese faction, replaced pro-Chinese General Werner von Blomberg as chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), the post which had superseded that of defense minister. In June the same year, furthermore, Germany and China effectively broke off diplomatic relations, with the German military advisory group to China being recalled and the German ambassador to China Oscar Trautmann also returning to Berlin. With these developments, both domestic and international political conditions were finally in place to allow formal cooperation between the Japanese and German military forces. On 7 October 1938, General Keitel and military attaché Oshima concluded the following formal agreement:¹⁶⁾

Agreement between the Military Authorities of Japan and Germany Regarding Intelligence and Subversive Activities Against the Soviet Union

In the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact concluded on 25 November 1936, the Imperial Japanese Army and the German Ministry of Defense hereby agree to:

1. share military intelligence related to the Soviet Army and the Soviet Union;
2. cooperate in carrying out subversive operations against the Soviet Union; and

3. meet at least once a year to discuss ways to facilitate the information sharing and intelligence operations mentioned in 1 and 2 as well as military matters within the scope of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

On the same day as this army treaty was concluded, Keitel and Kojima Hideo, Japan's naval attaché in Germany, signed a naval treaty with essentially the same content, with the exception that the provision concerning subversive operations against the Soviet Union was omitted. Furthermore, in order to incorporate into this naval agreement the Japanese side's wish to expand the area of the network of information exchange to include the United States, Great Britain and France, a supplementary treaty to that effect was signed in Tokyo in April 1939.¹⁷⁾

With the conclusion of these agreements on intelligence and strategy, Oshima's work as the army's military attaché was complete. On 8 October 1938, while still stationed in Berlin, Oshima transferred to his new post as ambassador to Germany. His next task was to advance, in cooperation with foreign minister Ribbentrop, negotiations toward the Tripartite Pact (the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact Reinforcement Negotiations).

VIII. The Actual Circumstances of the Oshima-Canaris Agreements

The realities of Japan-German cooperation based on the Oshima-Canaris agreements are by their very nature difficult to ascertain. There is also a considerable lack of relevant historical materials, since many important Japanese and German records were destroyed immediately before their respective surrenders. It is possible, however, to piece together some of the facts.

After the war, former naval attaché Kojima Hideo made the following testimony regarding the relationship between the office of the Japanese navy's military attaché to Germany and the Abwehr under Canaris: "Relations with the Abwehr under Canaris went very well. The Germans obtained information about Vladivostok and Russia, while Canaris provided the Japanese navy with materials about the United

States, particularly regarding American shipbuilding.”¹⁸⁾

What, then, of the Japanese army's relations with the Abwehr? Two aspects of the historical record are relevant here. One concerns the defection from the Soviet Union of General Luschkow. Director of the NKVD in the Far East, Luschkow crossed the Soviet border into Manchukuo on 13 June 1938, seeking asylum. The Japanese authorities removed him to Tokyo, where he was interrogated by Major Kotani Etsuo and others of the Russia section of the Second Bureau of the Army General Staff Office. In accordance with the Oshima-Canaris agreement, the Japanese side invited Major Erwin Scholl, the German army's acting military attaché to Japan, to attend the interrogation sessions in Tokyo. On 5 August, Colonel Greiling, a specialist in Russian affairs, arrived in Tokyo on a “special assignment from the Abwehr.” Greiling and Scholl studied the protocols of the Luschkow interrogation sessions and questioned Luschkow directly on two occasions. According to Scholl, the interesting aspect at this juncture was the tactful approach of the Japanese side. That is, by then the Japanese were treating Luschkow not as a prisoner but as a general, and were collaborating with him in “preparations for the destruction of the Stalin regime.”¹⁹⁾

The other notable aspect was the support the Japanese army gave to the exiled Ukrainian anti-Soviet movement. At a party given on 1 January 1939 to celebrate Canaris's fifty-second birthday, Oshima had “a long and interesting talk” with Lieutenant Colonel Helmuth Groscurth, head of the Abwehr's Second Section (which was in charge of sabotage and subversive operations). Oshima reportedly appeared “engrossed” in the fact that contact had been reestablished with the exiled Ukrainian anti-Soviet activist Pavlo Skoropadski.²⁰⁾

A career soldier from a prominent Ukrainian aristocratic family, Skoropadski had once served as aide-de-camp to Nicholas II, and had been appointed head of the war department of the Ukrainian Central Rada government during the Ukrainian civil war of 1918. When Ukraine was subsequently occupied by the German army, Skoropadski became head of the puppet government, but fled to Germany when the German occupation forces were defeated by the Soviet Red Army in December 1918.

He had since been continuing his anti-Soviet activities from Germany. Efforts toward utilizing Skoropadski once more had begun to appear within the Nazi government from around January 1938. As this renewed alliance between Skoropadski and the German authorities gained strength, Oshima, as a fellow collaborator in anti-Soviet intelligence and subversive operations in the Far East, associated himself with the Skoropadski faction.²¹⁾

IX. The Plan to Assassinate Stalin

Oshima carried out various subversive operations against the Soviet Union, including the training, in cooperation with both the subversive activities section and the Russia section of the Second Bureau of the Army General Staff Office, of White Russians and Ukrainians at a terrorist training camp he established by Lake Falkensee on the outskirts of Berlin. Anti-Soviet propaganda documents were also printed in large volumes and spread throughout target regions, some being scattered in Russian territory via balloons, others being shipped into Romania or distributed to Crimea by motorboat across the Black Sea.

Oshima also carried forward a plan for a coup d'état aimed at establishing an anti-Soviet government in Afghanistan, dispatching a Japanese military officer to infiltrate Afghanistan for that purpose. The scheme had been exposed in advance, however, and the Japanese officer was deported.²²⁾

At the beginning of 1939, Oshima and Abwehr chief Canaris drew up and carried out the most daring of all their collaborative operations: a plan to assassinate Joseph Stalin. Mobilizing Abwehr units as well as outpost units of the Japanese army stationed in Europe, the plan was reportedly for Russians trained as terrorists to cross the Caucasus border into the Russian winter resort area of Sochi on the Black Sea and attack Stalin's villa there. The plot ended in failure, however, when all the agents were shot dead while attempting to cross the border.

On 31 January 1939, Oshima gave Gestapo head Heinrich Himmler the following partial account of this operation: "With the cooperation of the Abwehr, we have

been carrying out subversive activities within Russia, via the Caucasus and Ukraine . . . We also succeeded in sending ten Russians armed with bombs into Russia across the Caucasus border. These Russians were assigned to assassinate Stalin. We attempted to send many more Russians across the border as well, but they were all shot dead at the border.”²³⁾

X. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact and Its Repercussions

Based on a bilateral treaty—the Anti-Comintern Pact—and its supplementary agreements, and supervised by a Japanese ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, the plan to assassinate Stalin may be regarded as an act of state terrorism in a quite literal sense. In this respect, the assassination plot was one of the logical consequences of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

With the signing of a nonaggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1939, such Japan-German cooperation in the area of intelligence sharing and subversive operations naturally came to a temporary halt. In his diary, Lieutenant Colonel Groscurth expressed sympathy for the deep shock and disappointment this turn of events must have caused Oshima and the office of the Japanese army’s military attaché in Germany. For Oshima himself, the German-Soviet pact left him no choice but to resign from his ambassadorship.

At a farewell gathering hosted by Canaris before Oshima’s return to Japan, Oshima criticized “the excesses of Germany’s foreign policy” and “sternly warned of the threat of the Soviet Union.” His words, however, were to no avail.²⁴⁾

Furthermore, Manaki Takanobu of the military attaché’s office expressed to Groscurth his “strong displeasure” at the German-Soviet nonaggression pact, and noted that “the Anti-Comintern Pact had already lost its validity.” This was undoubtedly the heartfelt sentiment of the Japanese military attaché’s office at the time. Moreover, this reference to “the Anti-Comintern Pact” denoted not only the Anti-Comintern Pact in itself as a purely ideological agreement, but rather the historically unique entirety that the Pact constituted in all its aspects as a relationship of practical coopera-

tion in information exchange, joint intelligence, and subversive operations against the Soviet Union and the Comintern.²⁵⁾

XI. Conclusion

In this paper, I have considered the origins of the Berlin-Tokyo Axis, not according to the conventional Ribbentrop-centric view; but rather from the perspective of the cooperative relationship established between the Japanese and German armies in the areas of intelligence sharing and subversive operations. It may be concluded from this analysis that the essence of the Berlin-Tokyo Axis consisted in the close cooperative ties fostered between the intelligence division (Abwehr) of the German Ministry of Defense and the Second Bureau of Japan's Army General Staff Office (as well as the office of the Japanese military attaché in Germany), and, at the personal level, between Abwehr chief Wilhelm W. Canaris and military attaché to Germany General Oshima Hiroshi.

This relationship between Canaris and Oshima remained largely undiscovered until recently. This was due to a number of reasons. First, because Canaris was arrested and executed just before Germany's surrender for his involvement in anti-Hitler activities, many documents relating to him, including his diary, were erased or destroyed. This loss was amplified by the systematic destruction and erasure of Japanese and German military intelligence documents immediately prior to the two countries' respective surrenders. The second reason is the silence maintained by the people involved. Right up to his execution at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, Ribbentrop refused to speak about his one-time close relationship with "the traitor to the Führer," that is, Canaris. At the Tokyo Trial, Oshima, for his own protection, kept his silence about the Stalin assassination plot and other aspects of his collaboration with Canaris. Even after his release from prison years later, Oshima for the most part refused to talk about his cooperation with Canaris in intelligence exchange and subversive operations, let alone in connection with the Tripartite Pact. Third, in postwar scholarship on German history, studies of Nazi foreign policy have been

dominated by a focus on Hitler and Ribbentrop, with a strong tendency to neglect the activities of other relevant figures, such as Canaris.

Given these circumstances, until recently many aspects regarding the origins of the Berlin-Tokyo Axis remained obscure. As the present paper has partially elucidated, however, as a source of the Berlin-Tokyo Axis, the Anti-Comintern Pact was in every respect created and applied through the logic of military intelligence.

Notes:

This paper was submitted to the international conference "Treaty-Bound: Japanese Politics and International Diplomacy 1853-Present" held in Berkeley on 16-17 November 2001 under the auspices of Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

- 1) On Joachim von Ribbentrop and his policy, see Wolfgang Michalka, *Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik 1933-1940*, Munich 1980.
- 2) See "Der Kampf der deutschen Marine gegen Versailles 1919-1935", bearbeitet von Kapitän zur See Schüssler, Berlin 1937, Nuremberg Document 156-C, in: *Trial of the Major War Criminals* (Nuremberg 1946-1948, hereinafter cited as *TMWC*), Vol. 34, pp. 530-607; Berthold J. Sander-Nagashima, *Die deutsch-japanischen Marinebeziehungen 1919 bis 1942*, Hamburg 1998; John W. Chapman, "Japan and German Naval Policy, 1919-1945", Josef Kreiner (ed.), *Deutschland-Japan. Historische Kontakte*, Berlin 1984; NHK, Dokyumento Shōwa Shuzaihan hen [Ed. by the NHK Team for the Program "Documents Showa"], *Dokyumento Shōwa*, Vol. 5, *Orenji Sakusen* (Orange Plan), Tokyo 1986, p. 86f; Bōeichō Bōei Kenshūjo Sensi Shitu (Military History Department of National Defense College, Defense Agency), *Sensi sōsho* (Military History Series), Vol. 98, *Sensuikan Shi* (History of Submarine), Tokyo 1979.
- 3) "Der Kampf der deutschen Marine gegen Versailles" pp. 565-566.
- 4) Heinz Höhne, *Canaris. Patriot im Zwielicht*. Munich 1976.
- 5) Dr. Hack to Steffen, June 13 192, in; Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (hereinafter cited as MA), Case 554.
- 6) Report by Canaris, MA, RM20/16. For this material I am heavily indebted to Dr. Berthold Sander-Nagashima of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt in Potsdam.
- 7) Ibid.
- 8) See John W.M. Chapman, "The Origins and Development of German and Japanese Military Cooperation", unpublished dissertation, Oxford University 1967, pp. 43-44.
- 9) Höhne, *Canaris*, pp. 233-234. Gerhard Krebs, *Japans Deutschlandpolitik 1935-1941*,

- Hamburg 1984, vol. 1, pp. 54-56.
- 10) Haushofer to Ribbentrop, June 24, 1935, in: Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Hrsg.), *Karl Haushofer. Leben und Werke*, Vol. 2, *Ausgewählter Schriftwechsel 1917-1946*, Boppard/Rh. 1979, Doc-No. 117.
 - 11) Report by Canaris, November 12, 1935, in; MA, RM11/2, v. Case 3/2.
 - 12) Friedrich Hack's documents. For this material my special thanks are due to Professor Dr. Bernd Martin of the University of Freiburg im Breisgau. Hereinafter cited as Hack-Martin papers. See also Bernd Martin, "Die deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen während des Dritten Reiches", in: Manfred Funke (ed.), *Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte*, Düsseldorf 1978.
 - 13) Report by Hack, November 15, 1935; Memorandum by Hack, November 30, 1935, in: Hack-Martin papers.
 - 14) Gaimushō hen (ed. by Foreign Ministry of Japan), *Nihon Gaikō nenpyō narabini Shuyō Bunsho* (Chronicle of Japanese Foreign Policy and Major Documents), Vol. 2, Tokyo 1965, pp. 352-354.
 - 15) Sanbō Honbu (The Japanese Army General Staff Office), "Jōhō Kōkan oyobi Bōryaku ni kansuru Nichi Doku Ryōgun Torikime (The Agreements between Japanese and German Armies on Military Intelligence and Subversive Operations), in: Bōeicho Bōei Kenkyūjo Toshokan (Library of the National Defence Institute), Bunko Miyazaki (Miyazaki Collections), 32.
 - 16) Ibid.
 - 17) "Doitu Gunbu tonō Kōshō ni kansuru Hōkoku" (Report by Kojima Hideo, Japanese Naval Attaché to Germany, June 1, 1938, on the negotiations with the German Navy), *Shōwa Shakai Keizai Shiryō Shūsei* (Documents on the economic and social History of the Shōwa-Japan), Vol. 6, pp. 82-83; Marine document 2/Skl 3739/39 gKds, May 25, 1939, in: MA, RM7/v. Case 553.
 - 18) Professor Bernd Martin's interview with Kojima Hideo, September 19, 1969. For this interview-memorandum I am indebted to Professor Dr. Bernd Martin.
 - 19) Scholl to Tippelskirch, August 10, 1938; Matzkey to Tippelskirch, November 1, 1938, in: MA, RH2/v.2939; Gendaishi Shiryō (Documents on the Shōwa-Period), Vol. 1, *Zoruge Jiken* (Case of Dr. Richard Sorge), (1), Tokyo 1962.
 - 20) Entry January 1, 1939, in: Hermuth Groscurth, *Tabebücher eines Abwehroffiziers* (hereinafter cited as Groscurth Diary), Stuttgart 1970, p. 164. On relations between Germany and Skoropadki see Fritz Fishcer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/1918*, Düsseldorf 1961, Chapter 20.
 - 21) Zai Soren Nihon Taishikan (Japanese Embassy to Moscow), *Taiso Seisaku Sankō Shiryō* (Materials relating to the Japanese Policy toward USSR), Vol. 3, *Ukuraina Mondai* (Ukrainian Problems), p. 96.

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- 22) Interrogation of General Oshima Hiroshi, March 5, 1946, in: Awaya Kentarō /Yoshida Yutaka (eds), *Kokusai Kensatsu Kyoku (IPS) Jinmon Chōsho* (Records the Interrogations of the International Prosecution Section), Vol. 33. # Oshima Hiroshi, Tokyo 1993, pp. 306-316.
- 23) Memorandum by Heinrich Himmler, January 31, 1939, in: *TMWC*, Vol. 40, pp. 327-328.
- 24) Entry, October 20, 1939, Groscruth Diary.
- 25) Entry, August 24, 1939, Groscruth Diary.