

# Globalization, Democratization and Governance

## — Conceptual Landscape —

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“Governance” means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, accountability, effectiveness and coherence (Commission of the European Communities, *European Governance: A White Paper*, COM (2001) 428 final, p. 8).

Globalisation presents *governance* with new questions. Governance, at all levels, establishes the conditions whereby individuals singly and collectively seek to meet their aspirations in society. Good, effective public governance helps to strengthen democracy, and human rights, promote economic prosperity and social cohesion, reduce poverty, enhance environmental protection and the sustainable use of natural resources and deepen confidence in government and public administration (OECD Ministerial Meeting, *Shaping Globalisation*, 27 June 2000).

We resolve therefore to create an environment — at the national and global levels alike — which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty. Success in meeting these objectives depends, *inter alia*, on good governance within each country. It also depends on good governance at the international level and on transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems. We are committed to an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial system (United Nations General Assembly, *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, 8 September 2000).

## I. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, or the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the subsequent collapse of the former Soviet Union and the downfall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in particular, a set of terms, Globalization, Democratization and Governance has become a fashionable core concept in scholarly and political debate as illustrated by the following examples:

The Commission on Global Governance which was “established in 1992 in the belief that international developments had created a unique opportunity for strengthening global co-operation to meet the challenge of securing peace, achieving sustainable development, and universalizing democracy,” maintained the critical importance of the improvement of global governance as follows:

The Commission on Global Governance has been established at a time of profound, rapid and pervasive change in the international system—a time of uncertainty, challenge and opportunity. Freed from East-West tensions, the world’s nations have more favorable conditions for working together to build a better world for all. ....They have become more interdependent in many respects. New problems have appeared that call for collective action. Global society faces the forces of both integration and division. These trends pose fresh challenges to the existing structures of international cooperation. It is therefore necessary to reassess their capacity and the values and concepts that underline them. ....

Authoritarian rule is giving way to more democratic government, but the transition is not complete and human rights are still widely violated (The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, 1995, pp. 366–367).

A similar argument will be found in the following address by Horst Köhler, IMF Managing Director, to the Board of Governors of the Fund in September 2002:

We should welcome the broad and critical public debate about globalization. I see this as an important part of the search for ways to make globalization more inclusive, and better balance its risks and opportunities. This means that integration into the global economy must be accompanied by investments in making integration pay off for the people of the world, and especially for the poor—investments in better national policies, and better cooperation. I see five guideposts for investing in better globalization:

1. *Interdependence.* Growing interdependence means that no nation should neglect the impact of its actions on the rest of the world.
2. *Self-responsibility.* Self-responsibility is the natural counterpart of freedom, human dignity, and national identity.
3. *Solidarity.* The fight against world poverty is everybody's business. We should all be actively engaged in promoting socially and environmentally sustainable development, by helping the poor to help themselves.
4. *A Level Playing Field.* This requires sound institutions and respect for the rule of law within nations. It requires transparent international decision-making. And it also requires an inclusive process for developing internationally-accepted standards and codes of conduct, as rules of the game for the global economy.
5. *No one-size-fits-all approach.* The diversity of the human experience should be understood as part of the wealth of this planet. Indeed, I see some degree of competition among economic models as healthy for the global economy.

This paper is an attempt, focusing on interrelationships, to deal with the political dimensions of Globalization, Democratization and Governance from a theoretical perspective. In other words, its chief objective is to shed light on the logic and dynamism of Globalization, Democratization and Governance in the contemporary post-Cold War world.

## II. Accelerated Globalization: Collapse of Soviet Bloc and World-wide Expansion of the Bretton Woods System in the post-Cold War Era

As reflected in phrases such as one world, only one earth, spaceship earth, global village, global commons, global economy, world ethics, earth politics, global standard, and global governance, the post-Cold War era will be characterized as the age of Accelerated Globalization. Although there is no consensus on the definition of globalization, it may be safely said that globalization refers to an ongoing process—widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary life, including the economic, political, social and cultural fields. And also, it may be stressed that the globalization process has been remarkably accelerated by the end of the Cold War rivalry, which was primarily caused by the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

In December 1989, immediately after the collapse of the Iron Curtain in Berlin and Gorbachev-Bush Malta Summit, OECD/DAC issued a policy statement entitled *Development Co-operation in the 1990s: Policy Statement by the DAC Aid Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies*, and declared the triumph of Western capitalism over Eastern communism as follows:

With the improvement in world economic conditions, a better East-West political climate, progress in the solution of a number of regional conflicts (with a hope also of permitting a reduction in heavy military expenditure burdens), a development towards more open and democratic societies and more effective policies across a range of developing countries, there may be opportunities for more progress in the 1990s than there was in the 1980s. Member governments recognize the importance of the fundamental political changes in Central and Eastern Europe and will support the important process of economic reform in these countries. This support will not diminish their determination to give high priority to their development co-operation with the Third World.

In May 1990 an *Agreement establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development* was signed by thirty-nine countries (plus the EEC and European Investment Bank). Its purpose, laid down in article 1 of the Agreement, is “in contributing to economic progress and reconstruction, .....to foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central and Eastern European countries committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics.” As will be illustrated by this article, the idea of establishing a new international financial institution (EBRD) to assist the “*transition*” of former communist countries in Eastern Europe was strongly influenced by strategic considerations. In the Agreement, the contracting parties, including ex-communist countries, for the first time in the history of development assistance by the multilateral institutions, explicitly declared the introduction of political conditionality in the implementation of aid programs. It was a political statement issued by the Western capitalist powers to declare the ultimate victory of capitalism as a world system.

In October 1991 the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on the International Monetary Fund issued a press communiqué in which Western capitalist countries declared the triumph of the Bretton Woods System as follows:

The Committee warmly welcomed the continuing commitment of Eastern European countries to stabilizing and reforming their economies along market oriented lines in spite of the added difficulties caused by the collapse of trade in the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) area.....The Committee praised the rapid and effective response of the Fund to the changes in Eastern Europe, and its role, in cooperation with the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Group of Twenty-Four, and the Paris Club, in organizing financing for the region in 1991.....The Committee welcomed the intention of the authorities in the U.S.S.R to intensify reliance on market mechanisms and to integrate the economy into the multilateral

trade and payments system.

In short, these events of 1989-1991, represent a critical turning point in the basic structures of the post-WW II international order: radical transformation from the broadly bipolar structure based upon US – Soviet rivalry to the unipolar structure based upon US hegemonic predominance. From the early 1990s onwards this sea change in the fundamental structure of the global system has caused the Accelerated Globalization which is inseparable from the global spread of Bretton Woods System.

### III. Global Spread of Democracy: Myth or Reality of Democratization

For some, Globalization and Democratization are two sides of the same coin, and these two processes proceed in tandem in the contemporary post-Cold War world. They maintain that: (1) globalization has been accelerated by the end of the Cold War; (2) the end of the Cold War has accelerated the world-wide spread of Bretton Woods System and the Washington Consensus, in which democratization constitutes an integral component; (3) accelerated globalization has replaced the characteristic Cold War issues of ideology, national prestige, alliance, military security, nuclear deterrence, arms control and disarmament, for example, with such normative issues as liberty, equality, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law, good governance and sustainable development; (4) democratization or democracy promotion, in particular, has become an accepted and necessary component of emerging international norm; (5) accelerated globalization should be a vehicle for the promotion of democracy, or democratization.

From this perspective, The Community of Democracies Ministerial Conference held in 2000, in Warsaw, was “of great historical significance as the first global-scale, ministerial-level conference on democratization” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2001*). The Conference adopted the Warsaw Declaration, whereby more than 100 signatories agreed to respect and uphold certain

core democratic principles and practices. It was a historic meeting which magnifies the close relationship between globalization and democratization, or the emergence of the “third wave” or “fourth wave” of democratization in the international system.

In sharp contrast to this perspective, others address fundamental and challenging questions about globalization *per se*, and its relationship with democratization: what is happening to democracy within the context of accelerated globalization in the contemporary post-Cold War world? Some of the arguments might be illustrated as follows:

Globalization, a dominant force in the 20th century’s last decade, is shaping a new era of interaction among nations, economics and people. It is increasing the contacts between people across national boundaries—in economy, in technology, in culture and in governance. But it is also fragmenting production processes, labour markets, political entities and societies. So, while globalization has positive, innovative, dynamic aspects—it also has negative, disruptive, marginalizing aspects (UNDP, *Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a Human Face*, p. 25).

At first glance globalization would seem to offer possibilities for enhancing democracy.....globalization has been unravelling state sovereignty, and there is a fundamental tension between sovereignty and democracy.....the removal of sovereignty ought, in principle, to present opportunities for increasing democracy.....Regrettably, however, globalization has thus far more usually made things worse. Contemporary post-sovereign governance is strewn with democratic deficits (Scholte, J. A., “The Globalization of World Politics,” in Baylis, J. and Smith, S. eds., *The Globalization of World Politics*, second ed., Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 28).

Globalization — simply the growing intensity, extent and deepening impact of

worldwide interconnectedness — poses anew the classic questions of political life: who rules, by what means, in whose interests and to what purpose? This is not to suggest, .....that the forces of globalization are eclipsing sovereign states but it is to acknowledge that the necessary conditions for sovereign and democratic self-governance are undergoing a significant transformation (McGrew, A., "Between Two Worlds: Europe in a Globalizing Era," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2002, p. 343).

Globalization is putting democracy in question and is itself being questioned as undemocratic. Its border crossing are undermining the traditional territorial basis of democracy and creating new political spaces which need democratizing. 'Global forces' are disrupting the supposedly independent, sovereign states and national communities which have provided democracy's main framework. And these 'global forces' are apparently beyond control or, more specifically, beyond democratic control. The political implications are wide reaching and far from clear (Anderson, J., "Questions of Democracy, Territoriality and Globalisation," in Anderson, J. ed., *Transnational Democracy*, Routledge, 2002, p. 6).

Which perspective might be justified? The following two remarks should be of critical importance in addressing this question:

First, in the latest issue of *Human Development Report 2002*, entitled *Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World*, the UNDP offered a rather pessimistic overview concerning the current situation of democratization as follows:

The last two decades of the 20th century saw a historic shift in the global spread of democracy. Some 81 countries—29 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 23 in Europe, 14 in Latin America, 10 in Asia and 5 in the Arab states—took steps towards democratization. Often this meant the overthrow of an authoritarian

one-party regime, the introduction of multiparty elections or both—a major advance. But the recent mixed experience with democracy in these countries—and around the world—shows that the process of deepening democracy and making it work for people has barely begun. Why is there less optimism about democracy today than in the euphoric period just after the cold war? One reason is that many countries that embraced democracy have suffered reversals, while many others have limited political competition and continuing abuse of political and civil rights. Today 47 of the 81 countries are considered functioning democracies. Then there's the disturbing spread of "illiberal" democracies....., where elected governments act the same as their authoritarian predecessors, depriving citizens of human rights and ignoring constitutional limits on power. So, why call them "transitional"? They do not seem to be transitioning anywhere (p. 63).

Secondly, in his article entitled "Questions of Democracy, Territoriality and Globalization," Professor Anderson, from the critical perspective, examined the complicated relationship between globalization and democratization in the contemporary post Cold-War world within the comprehensive framework of transnational democracy, and then he proposed a new research agenda as follows:

'Globalization' can be seen as simply a euphemism for 'capitalism' in its contemporary phase.....But the concept of globalization does highlight some genuinely new features which put transnational democracy 'on the agenda.'....

Four interrelated developments have put transnational democracy on the political agenda:

1. the weakening of democracy at national state level
2. the growth of transnational governance with 'democratic deficits'
3. the global hegemony and spread of the liberal democratic state
4. the growing demands for democracy in transnational arenas

(Anderson, J. *ibid.*, pp. 8-9).

In short, the links between globalization and democratization can be strong, but they are not automatic. Globalization has the potential to enhance democratization, but it does not by itself provide a guarantee for democratization. Globalization is inherently uneven and it is not a panacea. Globalization has been accompanied by huge growth of non-state actors, including multinational corporations, multilateral institutions (UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, for example), regional economic organizations (EU, APEC, ASEAN, NAFTA, for example), multilateral policy coordination groups (G-7, G-24, G-77, for example), sub-state associations and NGOs. Globalization has been extending the scope of democracy from conventional national democracy to transnational democracy, which spans the spectrum of scales from global to local. Overall, what really matters for the debate on the relationship between globalization and democratization is how to manage globalization in order to make globalization work for democratization.

#### **IV. Governance as a Catalyst: Interface between Globalization and Democratization**

In recent years, the term “governance” has become a catchphrase throughout the world. However, it means different things to different people depending on the theoretical framework that is used to define and evaluate the concept. In this regard, the following description will provide us with an overall picture of the current situation regarding the use of the term “governance”:

An important report of the United Nations on “global governance” signaled the need for rules that gather a consensus and are applied worldwide, even in the absence of a global government. In the context of development policy, “good governance” emphasizes transparency, accountability and effectiveness as neces-

sary conditions for successful public policy. “Multi-level governance” identifies the challenge of articulating the action of independent public actors at different geographic levels towards shared objectives. The concept of governance also concerns private actors, as in the case of “corporate governance”, which aims to ensure the accountability of management to the various stakeholders of a company (Commission of the European Communities, *White Paper on European Governance: Enhancing Democracy in the European Union*, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2000) 1547/7 final, p. 3).

As illustrated by these remarks, the concept of governance has been applied in many different contexts with varying meanings. In some cases, the term governance has been used as an academic and analytical concept to shed light on the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions of various systems of management with rules and operating norms at all levels. However, the term governance has also often been used as a normative concept, or as a “strategy” to promote a particular reform agenda for specific countries or organizations. Thus, governance is a highly politicized concept that raises fundamental questions about authority, legitimacy, rule of law, transparency and accountability; in other words, about democracy altogether.

Despite this diversity, one common element should be identified as a root cause of the emergence of the concept of governance. It is the catalytic function of globalization. As has been argued in the previous section, globalization is not an automatic passport to democratization. The process of globalization might be a potential force for freedom and justice, or democracy. However, there is a danger that globalization will have a negative effect on democracy. If globalization is indeed weakening the ability of states to make autonomous economic and political decisions, then one might argue that globalization is a dangerously anti-democratic force. Indeed, faced with the challenge of globalization, almost all organizations, including both industrial and developing countries, multilateral institutions, the market, and private corporations, have suffered from serious shortfalls in terms of participation,

representativeness, transparency and accountability.

It was these circumstances which encouraged the creation of the new analytical device or strategy of governance. In other words, the term governance is expected to work as a catalyst for managing and mediating the interface between globalization and democratization as might be illustrated by the following remarks:

Ministers.....reiterate their view that current discussions on the Twelfth General Review of Quotas should result in a substantial increase in the IMF's financial resources to strengthen its role in crisis prevention and resolution.....Ministers believe that the quota distribution should reflect the relative economic positions of member countries and recent developments in the world economy. In addition, ministers stress that, because quotas have increased by some 36-fold while basic votes per member remain unaltered since 1944, the number of basic votes should be substantially increased. The participation of developing countries in the decision-making structures of Bretton Woods institutions should be strengthened—particularly for sub-Saharan Africa (*Communiqué issued by the Intergovernmental Group of 24 on International Monetary Affairs and Development, on September 27, 2002*).

Recognizing the challenges posed by an expanding WTO membership, we confirm our collective responsibility to ensure internal transparency and the effective participation of all members. While emphasizing the intergovernmental character of the organization, we are committed to making the WTO's operations more transparent, including through more effective and prompt dissemination of information, and to improve dialogue with the public. We shall therefore at the national and multilateral levels continue to promote a better public understanding of the WTO and to communicate the benefits of a liberal, rule-based multilateral trading system (DOHA WTO Ministerial Declaration, 14 November 2001).

Changes in the world's economic, political and social systems have brought unprecedented improvements in human living conditions. But these changes also bring new uncertainties and challenges. The state's task is to find a balance between taking advantage of globalization and providing a secure and stable social and economic domestic environment (UNDP, *Governance for Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document*).

Many formerly poor countries have made rapid advances in standards of living, fuelled by expanded trade, capital and technology flows..... Yet many countries and people have not shared in this progress, or have even lost ground. At the same time, numerous countries, including countries in Africa, are adopting far-reaching economic and political reforms. They seek to increase opportunities for their people, and to integrate successfully into a highly competitive, interdependent world. Development and greater interdependence require high levels of domestic effort, high standards of accountability, and a strong civil society. Open, participatory economic and political systems are increasingly important factors..... More widespread and sustainable progress now depends on building strong capacities to achieve good governance, reduce poverty, and protect the environment (OECD/DAC, *Development Partnerships in the New Global Context*, May 1995).

Today, political leaders throughout Europe are facing a real paradox. On the one hand, Europeans want them to find solutions to the major problems confronting our societies. On the other hand, people increasingly distrust institutions and politics or are simply not interested in them..... The Union is often seen as remote and at the same time too intrusive..... Yet people also expect the Union to take the lead in seizing the opportunities of globalization for economic and human development, and in responding to environmental challenges, unemployment, concerns over food safety, crime and regional conflicts. They expect

the Union to act as visibly as national governments. Democratic institutions and the representatives of the people, at both national and European levels, can and must try to connect Europe with its citizens. This is the starting condition for more effective and relevant policies. The Commission identifies the reform of European governance as one of its four strategic objectives in early 2000 (Commission of the European Communities, *European Governance: A White Paper*, COM (2001) 428 final, p. 3).

In addition to these remarks by the global and regional multilateral institutions, which stress the critical importance of “good” governance, similar arguments will be found in the academic circles as follows:

The functions (of governance) to which Rosenau refers include coping with external challenges, preventing conflicts among its constituent units from tearing the system apart, obtaining necessary resources, and developing policies based on goals. Although governments exist to perform such functions, such institutions appear to be inadequate in an era of rapid change. Under such circumstances, these functions are performed to the extent that they are based on shared goals that form the essential basis for, and defining characteristic of, governance. Governance, as a broader term than government, is necessarily dependent on either intersubjective consensus or shared goals. Although governance can exist without government, government can hardly be effective without the consensus on which its authority is based. To the extent that they embody governance, the regulatory mechanisms of systems do not necessarily depend on the existence of governments endowed with formal authority and police powers (Doughty, J. and Pfaltzgraff, R. Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, fifth ed., Addison Wesley, 2001, p. 114).

.....the erosion of state capacity is accompanied by the emergence and growing

the authority of other institutions that assist and advise states or perform some of the tasks states once performed. A vast array of nongovernmental and intergovernmental actors now deal with environmental, human rights, economic, gender, and humanitarian issues that are beyond the competence of many governments, and together they are creating a global civic society. Thus we increasingly speak of *governance* rather than government (Mansbach, R. W., *The Global Puzzle*, third ed., Houghton Mifflin, 2000, p. 4).

Needless to say, it is premature to give definite judgment on the analytical utility of the concept of governance. It is also impossible to give definite evaluation on the emerging phenomena of governance as a strategy. What is of critical importance for the debate on governance is to draw a distinction between these two faces of governance.

## V. Epilogue: Normative Power Europe and Civilian Power Japan

Faced with the massive challenge of globalization, democratization and governance, the EU and Japan are searching for a new international identity/role as global powers in the post-Cold War world.

One suggestion is that the EU is pursuing a strategy to move beyond a “*civilian power*” to a “*normative power*” which promotes the diffusion of norms, good governance and democracy in particular (Manners, I., “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002). In this regard, the European Commission maintains as follows:

The European Union is well placed to promote democracy and human rights. It is continually seeking to improve its own democratic governance, and the Commission will shortly adopt a White Paper on the theme. Uniquely amongst international actors, all fifteen Member States of the Union are democracies es-

pousing the same Treaty-based principles in their internal and external policies. This gives the EU substantial political and moral weight. Furthermore, as an economic and political player with global diplomatic reach, and with a substantial budget for external assistance, the EU has both influence and leverage, which it can deploy on behalf of democratization and human rights (European Commission, "The European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries," Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2001) 252 final, pp. 3-4).

Needless to say, this proactive stance towards norms, or democratization in particular, might be associated with the EU's strategic consideration: the strengthening of its political and diplomatic influence, and ultimately the enhancement of stability and security in Europe and the world. In any case, there is no denying that the EU adopted the promotion of democracy as a prominent theme in EU internal and external policy.

In remarkably sharp contrast to the EU, Japan has been a passive and reactive follower in the promotion of democracy. As Professor Tsuneo Akaha maintains, "The Japanese are still suffering the loss of credibility and legitimacy in international affairs, particularly in the Asian regional context," and "Contemporary Japanese culture does not encourage the Japanese people to 'export' political values." (Akaha, T., "Japan: A Passive Partner in the Promotion of Democracy," in Schraeder, P. J. ed., *Exporting Democracy*, Lynne Rienner, 2002, p. 90).

A similar argument was developed by Mr. Yoichi Funabashi, a diplomatic correspondent for the Tokyo daily *Asahi Shimbun*, in 1991 immediately after the Persian Gulf War:

Japan should.....pursue two sometimes contradictory strategies: active engagement for world peace and military self-restraint. Its one-dimensional economic strategy must be replaced by more multifaceted, value-oriented policy. It is

time for the world's banker to design and contribute to an international order based on something more than mere economic growth. Japan should give higher priority to four values as foreign policy goals: to act as a model for, and lend assistance to, poorer countries in their own efforts for economic and democratic development; international peace keeping; promotion of human rights; and environmental protection. In particular a human rights policy has been problematic for Japan. For various reasons Japan has been reluctant to place human rights on its foreign policy agenda.....The painful lessons of the gulf crisis have helped to stimulate public interest and demands for the political reforms necessary for Japan to realize fully its new international role. A world power, after all, is a power with a commitment to others. Japan's path to power—as a global civilian power—must start with the commitment to reform from within and, increasingly, that seems destined to be the will of the public (Funabashi, Y., "Japan and the New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 5, 1991, p. 66 and 74).

A decade later in 2001, Japan and the European Union adopted An Action Plan for the EU-Japan Cooperation entitled *Shaping Our Common Future* in which both parties reaffirmed their strong belief in "peace, freedom, democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and the promotion of sustainable development," with greater focus on "concrete measures and concerted action."

Is it a big step for Japan to go beyond the "civilian power"? Has Japan overcome the enormous constraints which have limited Japan's embrace and support of democracy promotion? What really matters for Japan should be to construct a definite scheme which ensures the translation of "beautiful words" into "action."

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